CVE-2025-40007

  • Published: 2025-10-20T16:15:37.357
  • Last modified: 1761075085

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfs: fix reference leak

Commit 20d72b00ca81 (“netfs: Fix the request’s work item to not
require a ref”) modified netfs_alloc_request() to initialize the
reference counter to 2 instead of 1. The rationale was that the
requet’s “work” would release the second reference after completion
(via netfs_{read,write}_collection_worker()). That works most of the
time if all goes well.

However, it leaks this additional reference if the request is released
before the I/O operation has been submitted: the error code path only
decrements the reference counter once and the work item will never be
queued because there will never be a completion.

This has caused outages of our whole server cluster today because
tasks were blocked in netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io(), leading to
deadlocks in Ceph (another bug that I will address soon in another
patch). This was caused by a netfs_pgpriv2_begin_copy_to_cache() call
which failed in fscache_begin_write_operation(). The leaked
netfs_io_request was never completed, leaving `netfs_inode.io_count`
with a positive value forever.

All of this is super-fragile code. Finding out which code paths will
lead to an eventual completion and which do not is hard to see:

– Some functions like netfs_create_write_req() allocate a request, but
will never submit any I/O.

– netfs_unbuffered_read_iter_locked() calls netfs_unbuffered_read()
and then netfs_put_request(); however, netfs_unbuffered_read() can
also fail early before submitting the I/O request, therefore another
netfs_put_request() call must be added there.

A rule of thumb is that functions that return a `netfs_io_request` do
not submit I/O, and all of their callers must be checked.

For my taste, the whole netfs code needs an overhaul to make reference
counting easier to understand and less fragile & obscure. But to fix
this bug here and now and produce a patch that is adequate for a
stable backport, I tried a minimal approach that quickly frees the
request object upon early failure.

I decided against adding a second netfs_put_request() each time
because that would cause code duplication which obscures the code
further. Instead, I added the function netfs_put_failed_request()
which frees such a failed request synchronously under the assumption
that the reference count is exactly 2 (as initially set by
netfs_alloc_request() and never touched), verified by a
WARN_ON_ONCE(). It then deinitializes the request object (without
going through the “cleanup_work” indirection) and frees the allocation
(with RCU protection to protect against concurrent access by
netfs_requests_seq_start()).

All code paths that fail early have been changed to call
netfs_put_failed_request() instead of netfs_put_request().
Additionally, I have added a netfs_put_request() call to
netfs_unbuffered_read() as explained above because the
netfs_put_failed_request() approach does not work there.

Related CVE by CWE

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How to fix CVE-2025-40007

CVE-2025-40007 is a unknown severity vulnerability affecting the affected product.

Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: fix reference leak Commit 20d72b00ca81 (“netfs: Fix the request’s work item to not require a ref”) modified netfs_alloc_request() to initialize the reference counter to 2 instead of 1. The rationale was that the requet’s “work” would release the second reference after completion (via netfs_{read,write}_collection_worker()). […]

Exploit Difficulty: HARD
⏱️ Time to exploit: > 4 hours
🛠️ Required skills: Advanced security expertise
💰 Public exploits: Rare or not public

How to Fix:

1 Identify affected systems

- Check if you're running the affected product

2 Immediate actions

- Update to the latest patched version
- If patching is not immediately possible: restrict network exposure, apply least-privilege access

3 Verification

- Test the fix in a staging environment first
- Review logs for signs of exploitation
- Monitor for IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)

4 Long-term prevention

- Enable automatic security updates
- Set up vulnerability monitoring
- Review and harden security configurations

Exploit Difficulty Assessment

HARD
⏱️ Time to Exploit: > 4 hours
🛠️ Skills Required: Advanced security expertise
💰 Public Exploits: Rare or not public

Vulnerability Timeline

Oct 20, 2025
Vulnerability Published

CVE details first published to NVD database

Jan 01, 1970
Last Modified

CVE details were updated

Oct 28, 2025
Imported to Database

Added to this CVE tracking system

Detection Rules & IOCs

No specific detection rules generated for this vulnerability type.

No vendor/product data available.