CVE-2025-38554

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped

By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for
a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be
recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache.

Race description is borrowed from Jann’s discovery report:
lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under
rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it
can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the
vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds,
vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA.

In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu()
will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through
vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops
the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm.
This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA’s
mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA’s mm,
so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF.

The diagram depicting the race:
T1 T2 T3
== == ==
lock_vma_under_rcu
mas_walk

mmap

vma_start_read
__refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire
munmap
__vma_enter_locked
refcount_add_not_zero
vma_end_read
vma_refcount_put
__refcount_dec_and_test
rcuwait_wait_event

rcuwait_wake_up [UAF]

Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was
already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing
UAF in T1.

To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and
grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation.

[surenb@google.com: v3]